OAuth 2.0 mind map

Since the publication of The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework (RFC 6749) in 2012, both the IETF OAuth work group and the OpenID Foundation have released many other RFCs that extend/complement the base framework and the OAuth 2.0 ecosystem. I found this variety a bit confusing, so I figured I’d do a mind map and short summary of the specs for future reference. Here it goes.

oauth-mindmap

RFC 6749 – The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework

This is the core OAuth 2.0 standard. It defines the different roles (resource owner, client, authorization server, etc.) and the main authorization endpoints, flows and artifacts. Extensibility rules are also defined in this document. The “framework” on the RFC title is important: there are multiple authorization scenarios and a lot of aspects are left unspecified, which somehow justifies all the satellite specs. This was also the reason for heavy criticism on the early days of OAuth 2.0.

Tokens

RFC 6750 – Bearer Token Usage

The main spec doesn’t define the format of access tokens nor how they should be used to access protected resources. The most commonly deployed tokens, however, are bearer tokens. As the name implies, the possession of such tokens is sufficient to access the associated resources. RFC 6750 defines how bearer tokens should be sent to resource servers.

RFC 7009 – Token Revocation

Authorization servers usually allow resource owners to revoke previously granted authorizations. This RFC proposes an additional endpoint for authorization servers that clients can use to invalidate tokens they no longer need.

RFC 7662 – Token Introspection

The main spec doesn’t cover the actual usage of access tokens nor the procedure that resource servers should apply to verify them. More than verifying if a token is valid, resource servers are likely to need the associated metadata (e.g. the granted scopes) for authorization decisions. In a common deployment scenario, both authorization and resource servers are under the same domain, hence being able to somehow share the token validation logic. For more loose scenarios, RFC 7662 defines a token introspection endpoint that resource servers may use to query the authorization server to obtain the status and metadata of a token that is presented by an OAuth 2.0 client.

RFC 7519 – JSON Web Token (JWT)

JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object.” JWTs can be used with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption (JWE), enabling the claims to be integrity protected and/or encrypted. The spec includes a set of predefined claims – such as the issuer, subject and audience identifiers – as well as processing rules. JWTs can be used as self-contained access/refresh tokens.

More on obtaining authorization grants

RFC 7636 – Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients (PKCE)

Clients that can’t keep their credentials private are called public clients. This is the case of most native applications. As such, the authorization code grant cannot be securely used by this type of clients. This spec defines a proof of possession extension that makes the code grant usable by these clients. Read this post for more details on PKCE and the underlying vulnerability.

Device Flow (draft)

Defines an authorization flow for clients executing on devices with limited input and/or browsing capabilities (e.g. TVs, STBs). It is based on out-of-band codes that the user provides to the authorization server using another device with better user-agent capabilities (e.g. a tablet).

Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices

Defines rules to encode authorization response parameters when multiple response types are used. Also defines response mode, a new authorization request parameter that allows the client to specify how the response should be delivered (query-string, fragment, etc.).

Form Post Response Mode

Based on the previous spec, this document defines a new response mode on which the authorization response is returned to the client via a auto-submit HTML form using an HTTP POST. This is different from the redirects (HTTP GET) defined on the core OAuth spec, with the advantage of reducing the likelihood of codes and tokens being logged as part of URLs.

Management

RFC 7591 – Dynamic Client Registration Protocol

Clients are usually registered by their developers in the intended authorization servers. This spec defines a means of dynamically registering clients Registration requests include items such as redirect URIs, intended grant types and web page URLs, and the response contains the assigned client ID and secret. There’s also a complementary experimental spec for subsequent changes to the client metadata.

Authorization Server Discovery Metadata (draft)

This draft defines the format of a JSON document that a client can use to obtain the different endpoints and capabilities of an authorization server. This metadata includes items such as the URL of the token endpoint and the supported response types. Besides this draft there’s also the OpenID Connect version, which is final and actually appeared first. The draft is compatible with the later.

Other types of authorization grants

RFC 7521 – Assertion Framework for Client Authentication and Authorization Grants

Defines mechanisms for OAuth 2.0 to work with other identity systems using assertions. The spec defines processing rules and message flows for using assertion-based client authentication and authorization grants when interacting with the token endpoint. This means that authorization grants are obtained by other means, instead of using the common OAuth flows. There’s a profile using SAML 2.0 assertions and another using JWT assertions.

Informational & best practices

RFC 6819 – Threat Model and Security Considerations

Defines a set of threats to the authorization flows and the corresponding countermeasures. Since OAuth 2.0 doesn’t include any “message security” on the base flows, being aware of those security aspects is very important to ensure the protocols’ security.

OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (draft)

Native clients – such as mobile applications – can’t keep their credentials private. This spec defines a set of best practices for implementing such clients, namely the usage of the device’s native browser for authorization flows. I’ve discussed this subject in detail on a previous post.

Authentication

OpenID Connect Core 1.0

OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol“. Actually it’s not that simple; it’s a whole new subject, but this post wouldn’t be complete without mentioning it. The spec defines extensions to OAuth 2.0 that enable clients to verify the identity of the user that authenticated on the authorization server.